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C H A P T E R E I G H T
THE CHANGING IDEAS ABOUT
VALUATION MECHANISMS IN THE
INTERWAR PERIOD: TOEPLITZ, MARLIO
AND THE ‘GREAT TRANSFORMATION’1
Marco Bertilorenzi and Giuseppe Telesca
Many analysts of markets see in prices a mechanism of coordination
between buyers and sellers of goods. Neoclassical economists believe
that for market coordination to be ef!cient, prices have to freely "uctu-
ate (Of!cer 2014). But not all agree that markets work ef!ciently when
prices are freely "oated. Sociologists have demonstrated that the valua-
tion of goods in markets is not always free from administrative or social
imperatives, nor that it should be (Callon et al. 2007; Callon, 1998).On
the contrary, many alternative valuation devices work more ef!ciently
than the determination of prices based on comparisons between quan-
tities of goods demanded and supplied. Famous sociologists like Karl
Polanyi warned their contemporaries that this was even truer when
markets became global. According to Polanyi, in the second part of the
nineteenth century it was theHaute Finance that assured the good oper-
ation ofmarkets on aworld scale. The author, in a book highly critical of
the opaque idea of self-regulating markets, imagined the global markets
of the late nineteenth centuries as loosely regulated by what he de!ned
a “powerful social” instrument, "exible and very effective, which was
able to remain “independent of single governments, [but] in touch
with all; independent of the central banks, even of the Bank of Eng-
land, [but] closely connected with them” (Polanyi 1944: 10). During
normal economic times, the Haute Finance provided a loose form of
1 The authors contributed to the writing of this chapter in an equal way. Marco Bertilorenzi
wrote sections 3 and 4, while Giuseppe Telesca is the author of sections 1 and 2; introduction
and conclusion were written together.
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coordination, reinforced by the tight sociability of elite bankers (the
entre-soi that Bourdieu talks about), which allowed markets to operate
quite ef!ciently even when crises associated with the making of global
markets emerged, as in the case of Baring’s bail-out in 1890 for instance
(Ford 1956; Mitchener and Weidenmier 2008; Cassis 2011:9–13).
It has been correctly pointed out that Polanyi’s idea about theHaute
Finance is postulated rather than demonstrated. Polanyi, for instance,
does not offer any insights on the mechanism through which theHaute
Finance managed to grant “ the hundred years’ peace” to the world – a
research question that has fascinated economists working on the the-
ory of group and organization (Olson 1965), political scientists work-
ing in the !eld of international relations (Kirshner 2007; Tomz 2007),
and economic historians (Flores and Flandreau 2012). Polanyi does not
explain either the structure or the composition of the Haute Finance,
limiting himself to mention the House of Rothschild as the pillar of
this “mysterious institution.” In spite of this vagueness, one of the main
heuristic insights of Polanyi’s book is that markets’ self-regulation is an
historical construction and not a natural fact. The real breakthrough
of Polanyi was to consider the creation of a laissez-faire economy as the
outcome of deep interventions by governments, and its continuation as
a real commitment by economic and !nancial elites. Polanyi was struck
by a paradox of the liberal economic thought that, from the enclosures
onwards, had consistently failed to recognize that “the introduction of
free markets, far from doing away with the need of control, regulation,
and intervention, enormously increased their range. [ . . . ] This paradox
was topped by another. While laissez-faire economy was the product of
deliberate state action, subsequent restrictions on laissez-faire started
in a spontaneous way. Laissez-faire was planned; planning was not”
(Polanyi 1944, 140–141). If the af!rmation of the liberal economy was
led by theHaute Finance in the nineteenth century, the commitment of
!nancial and industrial elites was decisive in the attempt of “recasting
bourgeois Europe” after the shock of the Great War (Maier 1975). The
!nancial dogma to stabilize currencies, which spread throughout the
1920s and captured the energy of governments, central banks and new
intergovernmental agencies, was highly engaging for private bankers
committed to this economic paradigm. Likewise, the return to pre-
war free trade, advocated by national and international public pow-
ers as a medium/long term goal of the international polity after the
Treaty of Versailles, became an explicit commitment for the industrial
elites.
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Like Polanyi, we are interested in the question of valuation in global
markets. Also like Polanyi, we are interested in the shattering effects
of the Great War on the forms of market coordination that were held
legitimate before the con"ict. For this reason, we investigate the tran-
sition from the late nineteenth century forms of regulation of these
globalmarkets to the interwar period, with the goal of providing a better
understanding of the mechanisms that affect the legitimacy of various
valuation devices over time.
This scrutiny provides insights into the process of valuation: while
advocating the free market and market self-regulation as crucial for
the creation of value in their business, !nancial and business elites
created more or less informal coordination tools that, deeply altering
the free market process, ended up becoming the new devices presiding
over the process of valuation of both !nancial products and commodi-
ties. In some cases, this movement produced even paradoxical ideas: for
instance that !nancial speculation could help the currency stabilization
or that cartels could help the settlement of free trade (Hara 1994; Barjot
1994, 2013). In this paper, we ask: after the First World War (WWI),
what happened to the informal mode of regulation which had allowed
prices to be sustained arti!cially when markets failed and prices plum-
meted? Did the legitimacy of this informal mode of regulation resist the
sweeping changes introduced in the economy by its total mobilization
for the war effort?
To answer these questions, we adopt a Bourdieuan approach to the
sociology of valuation devices, based on methods that are close the
prosopographic approaches of elites. Among the groups that we iden-
tify as having a key in"uence on the choice of valuation devices dur-
ing the transition that interests us, we focus on the Haute Finance and
the elite industrialists. We identify both groups as strong supporters of
the idea of self-regulation of markets, a concept which was understood
very differently from today. Far from meaning that prices should never
be the object of interventions by powerful market actors, this idea of
self-regulation meant that some interventions on prices were legitimate
when conducted by powerful private global forces (cartels of producers
for instance) while others (conducted by the state in particular) were
not. Central in this question of legitimacy of pricing techniques was
the boundary drawn between social groups, as the sociology of valua-
tion and boundary-making tells us (Lamont 2012).
Section one and two of this paper deal with a case study in the
world of high banking to illustrate the pre-war !nancial elites’ initial
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resilience, and then adaptation, to the transformations in the forms of
regulation of global markets after WWI. These sections are centered
around the !gure of Jo´zef Leopold Toeplitz (1866–1938), the Banca
Commerciale Italiana (BCI’s) executive director from 1915 to 1933.
Founded in Milan in 1894, within a few decades the BCI became the
Italian universal bank prototype and the most important bank in the
country.2 The third and fourth sections look at Louis Marlio (1878–
1952), executive director of Pechiney, the French aluminum champion
of which he became president in 1939.
Building on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of human capital, the !rst sec-
tion explores Toeplitz’s “set of the usable resources and powers” acquired
before WWI – an endowment probably inadequate to deal with the
challenges spawned by the ‘Great Transformation’. However, Bour-
dieu’s observation that individuals can convert one type of capital into
another, and hence modify the volume and distribution of their assets
over time, offers a possible explanation for Toeplitz’s post-war resilience
(Bourdieu 2010:119–126). Generalizing Toeplitz’s experience, one can
assume that, even though, in the face of the interwar !nancial distur-
bances, the loose and informal regulation of markets of the late nine-
teenth century was no longer ef!cient, older bankers still abided by the
old rules.
In section two we will see this in relation to Toeplitz and the currency
market during the 1920s. The third and fourth sections show, starting
from the example of Marlio, how industrialists confronted with a deep
economic crisis innovated by formalizing new rules of valuation. In par-
ticular, it explores the way in which Marlio, one of the main represen-
tatives of the industrial elite who participated in the process of legit-
imation of cartels, interacted with a new group of technocrats within
newborn international organizations such as the International Cham-
ber of Commerce (ICC) and the League of Nations (LoN). These insti-
tutions and their forbearers made clear their intention to both come
back to economic orthodoxy and free trade, and ease the re-integration
of the markets after the shock of the war. As these sections demon-
strate, the perception of cartels changed during the interwar years, as
they moved from being seen as institutions of international economic
self-regulation during the 1920s, to being perceived as instruments
2 In 1929, the BCI’s total assets were equal to 10,358 million lire, compared with the 6,748 of the
Credito Italiano. In continental Europe, only the Deutsche Bank (with 13,669 million) and the
Darmsta¨dter (10,721 million) fared better than the BCI (Confalonieri 1994: 245).
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which governments supported, endorsed, or even controlled during the
1930s.
THE TRAJECTORY OF JO´ZEF TOEPLITZ: A PRIVILEGED
SON OF THE FIRST GLOBALIZATION
Toeplitz was born in Zychlin, nearWarsaw, on 10 December 1866. Fifth
of eleven children, he was part of an in"uential Polish-Jewish family
with interests in agriculture, trade and banking. Since a Polish national
state did not exist in 1866, Toeplitz acquired Russian nationality. The
wealthy status of his family gave him the opportunity to enjoy a cos-
mopolitan education in Mitau, Gand and Aachen. Although he did
not !nalize his master’s in engineering, the experience gained abroad
during these years would prove crucial for his career (Telesca 2010:19–
21).
In 1890, Toeplitz moved to Genoa with the aim of learning the bank-
ing profession by exploiting both his qualities and his family ties with
the then director of the Banca Generale (BG) Genoa subsidiary, Otto
Joel.3 A few years later, in 1893–1894, the Italian banks went through
dif!culties both due to internal factors, their tendency to over-invest
in real estate assets, and external shocks – a typical episode of capital
out"ows from periphery to core countries (De Cecco 1990:22–23). This
turmoil led to the salvaging of one of the then existing issuing institutes,
the Banca Romana, and the collapse of the two biggest banks inspired by
the Pe´re´ire brothers’ model, the Credito Mobiliare and the BG (Quilici
1935; Pantaleoni 1977). A momentous change in the Italian banking
system ensued, and was built on a reorganization of the issuing institutes
and the founding of universal banks inspired by the German model.4
Joel, who was general inspector at the BG when it collapsed, played
a crucial role in the months that preceded the founding of the BCI
(October 1894) and, together with his German colleague Friedrich
Weil, he was appointed as a BCI executive director (Garruccio 2002).
After a brief adventure as director at the newly established Genoa
subsidiary of the Banca Russa (BR) – a choice prompted by a desire to
3 Toeplitz’s uncle, Benedikt, was married to Joel’s aunt, Friederike.
4 In August 1892 the Banca Nazionale del Regno, the Banca Toscana di Credito and the Banca
Nazionale Toscana merged into the Banca d’Italia. The law provided for the newly established
bank a prominent status with respect to the already existing issuing institutes: Banco di Napoli
and Banco di Sicilia (Bonelli and Cerrito 2003: 103–106).
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move closer to Poland, the BR headquarters being located in St Peters-
burg – in June 1895, Toeplitz joined his mentor at the BCI (Toeplitz
1963:32–33). The move to Milan inaugurated Toeplitz’s slow ascent to
the BCI’s summit. Initially, the banker "anked Joel in a series of minor
affairs and merchant banking activities (Confalonieri 1979:339–349).
Afterwards, Toeplitz was entrusted with the opening of two crucial sub-
sidiaries in Naples and Venice, making him a key protagonist of the
BCI’s territorial expansion through the country. In Naples, he built up
crucial relationships, among others with Giuseppe Volpi and Dannie
Heineman, which we will return to later. Toeplitz’s return to Milan in
1903 resulted in a growing involvement in the BCI’s industrial business
and marked a further step toward top-tier positions. On the one hand,
he was appointed !duciary on the boards of an increasing number of
BCI’s client !rms (in 1930 Toeplitz was member of forty-!ve boards of
directors in both !rms and banks);5 on the other hand, when a con-
sortium of banks headed by the Bank of Italy (BoI) saved the Societa`
Bancaria Italiana (SBI) from bankruptcy in 1907, Toeplitz was entrusted
with scrutinizing the SBI’s balance sheets on behalf of the BCI. When
the BCI’s governance reform eventually materialized – establishing a
functional separation between the headquarters and the Milan of!ces –
Toeplitz was called to the helm of the branch and subsidiary inspec-
tion services, thus attaining the crucial role of coordinating between
the bank’s centre and its periphery. This took place in November 1907,
and Toeplitz’s ascent indicated a future succession to his mentor. Dur-
ing his apprenticeship at the BCI, Toeplitz had learned how to perform
the four roles that, according to information economics, characterize
!nancial intermediaries: monitoring, coordination, control and com-
mitment (Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993).
Before WWI, Italian bankers’ practical knowledge was not framed
in any theoretical scheme, nor was such a pattern uncommon in other
countries, except for France, where the education of bankers was a more
formalized process (Cassis 1991:67–68). A move in the1890s from the
Cre´dit Mobilier to the Kreditbanken model, combined with a shift from
unit to branch banking, induced the newly established Italian banks to
look for a set of skills that academia was still unable to supply. To !ll
this gap, the new banking elite was partly recruited from abroad, and
partly selected among Italian bankers whose know-how was obtained
5 Archivio Storico Intesa-Sanpaolo (hereafter ASI-BCI), Database !duciari Banca Commerciale
Italiana in progress.
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on the job (Piluso 1998). The considerable number of foreign directors
and managers at the BCI can be justi!ed on this ground, rather than
relying on the nationalists’ mysti!cations against the “German banks”.
The foreign bankers granted to the Italian universal banks a compet-
itive advantage consisting of the transfer of !nancial technology, net-
works and information (Goldshmit 1969:363).
Toeplitz, who had become an Italian citizen in January 1912,6 suc-
ceeded de facto to Joel at the helm of the BCI in spring 1915, amid the
trouble instigated by the Italian intervention in WWI and a hidden
struggle for control of the BCI (Montanari 1995:23). His leadership,
together with the Italian Fenoglio, became of!cial only inMarch 1917.7
Three years later when Fenoglio resigned, Toeplitz became “the boss”
of the BCI.8 He remained at the helm of the bank until March 1933,
when he was obliged to resign.9 Afterwards, Toeplitz served another
year as deputy President of the board, before abandoning the BCI and
the scene of the Italian economy. In 1938, following Benito Mussolini’s
order to give no relevance to the news of his death, only obituaries in
the national newspapers brie"y acknowledged the end of a banker who,
The New York Times emphatically recalled, once had “his !nger on the
pulse of three-quarters of the nation’s largest !rms.”10
Bourdieu explains that a similar quantity of cultural capital produces
a different yield according to the social agent’s possibility of mobilizing
a network of more or less institutionalized relations. Toeplitz’s cultural
capital – already above the average because of his cosmopolitan edu-
cation – was strengthened by the “multiplier effect” of his prestigious
social capital (Bourdieu 1980). It has already been mentioned that he
was Joel’s cousin; it must also be speci!ed that his father, Bonawen-
tura, was a correspondent of the Rothschild Frankfurt branch and his
uncle, Henryk, was among the founders of the most important commer-
cial bank in Warsaw, the Bank Handlowy (Toeplitz 2004:363–368). In
other words, Toeplitz’s family was part of the “come´die !nancie`re” that,
“from the titans of the City or the Chausse´e d’Antin, to their trusted
correspondents in the great ports and entrepoˆt, to small local bankers
6 Archivio di Stato di Milano, Gabinetto Prefettura I, 532, Uf!cio di Stato Civile di Milano, 1
February 1912.
7 ASI-BCI, Verbali Consiglio di Amministrazione (hereafter VCA), 27 March 1917.
8 Il padrone was the epithet which designed Toeplitz among his inner circle of collaborators
(Malagodi 1999: 73).
9 ASI-BCI, Verbali Assemblea Generale, vol. IV, ff. 68–69, 25 March 1933.
10 “Giuseppe Toeplitz, Financier, is Dead,” The New York Times, 30 January 1938.
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in manufacturing centers and agricultural markets,” distinguished the
different tiers of the Haute Finance (Landes 1958:16). Toeplitz’s status
was not comparable, either in terms of social prestige or in terms of
political in"uence, with that of the “aristocratic bourgeoisie” which had
dominated international !nance before 1914 (Harris and Thane 1984;
Cassis 1994), however, by means of his origin and education, his posi-
tion and functions within the BCI, and the ties built with the Italian
business community and abroad, Toeplitz had a signi!cant amount of
human capital at his disposal from which most of his colleagues were
precluded.
Bourdieu’s human capital can be seen as the “aces in a game of cards”
that de!ne the chances of an individual of “pro!ting in a particular
!eld” (Bourdieu 1985:724). Some individuals have better chances of
being prominent in a certain !eld because they are endowed with more
capital than others – this was the case of Toeplitz beforeWWI. An indi-
vidual’s process of capital formation, however, is a dynamic one that can
experience both accumulation and erosion. After WWI, the bankers of
Toeplitz’s generation were confronted with an erosion of their capital,
namely the cultural one acquired on-the-job training and inadequate
to deal with the completely new scenario. The stabilization of the cur-
rencies during the 1920s, analyzed in the next section, exempli!es this
process of loss. This case study can be seen as a sort of natural exper-
iment to test a broader reality, which, during the interwar years, con-
fronted a generation of top-league bankers obliged to adjust to the new
climate.
TOEPLITZ’S CAREER DURING THE INTERWAR YEARS:
A PAINFUL PROCESS OF APPRENTICESHIP
After WWI, returning to the same path of the belle e´poque’s economic
growth by simply imitating the pre-war recipes proved to be damag-
ing. In particular, the persistence of a gold standard mentalite´ became
the symbol of the stubborn resolution with which the post-war imbal-
ances were treated. The commitment to gold convertibility, rather than
to domestic fundamentals such as employment and growth, far from
unraveling the problems, added new obstacles to their solution (Eichen-
green 1992; Eichengreen and Temin 2000). The “erratic and perverse”
behavior of capital movements did the rest (Bloom!eld 1950).
A few nonconformist economists and publicists dared to indicate a
different way out of the crisis. Inspired by the success of Keynes’ The
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Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919), this group of intellectuals
deployed a remarkable activism in promoting appeals, conferences and
other initiatives. If the unorthodox stances of these iconoclasts ren-
dered them “persona non grata in orthodox banking circles during the
1920s” (Schuker 2003:65–66), their proposals received a good deal of
attention both within international organizations such as the LoN and
the ICC, and in the specialized press. In November 1921, for instance,
the Rivista Bancaria (RB) – founded one year before under the auspices
of the newly established Italian banking association – published Gustav
Cassel’s report on currency stabilization, presented at the LoN Finan-
cial Committee in September 1921. The document invited, inter alia,
to ignore the pre-war parity of currencies in order to escape the de"a-
tionary effects of a painful adjustment. Cassel suggested the adoption of
some form of managed currency stabilization, a solution which would
have implied the direct intervention of the governments (Cassel 1921).
Commenting on Cassel’s report, the director of the RB, Attilio Cabi-
ati, included in his article the anonymous opinions of two prominent
Italian bankers. As emerges from the BCI’s archives, Toeplitz was one
of them.11 In his contribution, the banker dismissed Cassel’s ideas as
“utopias” destined to thrill “the large public” but which fell short in the
eyes of both rational scholars and wise practitioners. Toeplitz de!ned
“harmful” and “arti!cial” Cassel’s plan, adding sarcastically that its
“only positive aspect consisted in the dif!culty to turn it into practice.”
Only the reliance on “old formulas” and “permanent principles” could
have produced the conditions for a real economic recovery according to
the banker, who assigned a crucial role to the speculation which “coop-
erated to the balance of payment’s equilibrium of the countries, namely
the ones with a weak currency” (Cabiati 1921:597–598).
Toeplitz’s enthusiasm for speculation can be understood not only in
light of his mindset !rmly grounded in the laissez-faire era, but also if
one considers the remarkable pro!ts realized by the BCI in currency
arbitrations during that period.12 Having outlined Toeplitz’s initial per-
spective, two attempts of currency stabilization in which the BCI played
a signi!cant role – the Polish loan (1924) and the maneuvers for the
stabilization of the Italian lira (1925–1926) – will provide the base for
11 Toeplitz sent a letter to Cabiati which was partially reproduced in the article (ASI-BCI, Copi-
alettere Toeplitz (hereafter CpT) 17, ff. 1–3).
12 In 1925, faced with the !rst signs of a de"ationary twist, Toeplitz told his board of directors
that the new governmental policy would mean less pro!ts in currency arbitrations, a situation
that everyone had to “peacefully accept” (ASI-BCI, VCA, 30 June 1925).
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exploring Toeplitz’s dif!cult process of adaptation to the new reality
during the 1920s.
The appointment ofWladyslawGrabski as primeminister, inDecem-
ber 1923, created the conditions for the launch of a BCI Polish loan.
Grabski, convinced that Poland was able to stabilize the currency with-
out being obliged to endure the severe prescriptions of the LoN, at
the beginning of 1924 established a central bank independent of the
government (Bank Polski) and withdrew the worthless Polish mark,
replacing it with the zloty. Grabski’s maneuver, consisting of introduc-
ing a new currency without previously balancing the budget, was built
on Poland’s capacity to negotiate a series of piecemeal loans, which
were less costly in political terms (Pease 1986:22–25). The BCI was
the !rst bank to buy into this strategy, with the offer of a 400 million
lire loan for twenty years at 7 per cent.13 The negotiations ended in
March 1924 and the loan was "oated in two tranches: three hundred
million lire were offered on 18April and the remaining hundredmillion
by the end of October. The loan, of!cially devoted to the constitution
of the Polish tobacco monopoly and the modernization of the sector,
established that 60 percent of the imported tobacco should come from
Italy. Its alleged commercial purpose, however, did not remove the
risk that the loan could be used – and was used, indeed – to buy for-
eign reserves, in the case of dif!culties of the zloty (Asso 1993:123–
142). This risk was stressed upon by the Director of the BoI, Bonaldo
Stringher – unaware of the negotiations and !nding himself faced by a
fait accompli – in an irritable letter to the then FinanceMinister Alberto
De Stefani, on 8 March 1924 (De Cecco 1993:755).
Toeplitz saw in the Polish loan the !rst of a series of ambitious stabi-
lization loans led by the BCI in Eastern Europe. Well aware of the risks
connected to the loan, however, he had conditioned the conclusion
of the negotiations on an Italian government assurance of intervening
in the case of war and replacing the Polish government in the pay-
ment of the interest.14 Surprised by such an atypical axis between the
government and the BCI, not always on good terms, the American
13 With the lira "oating around quota twenty-three against the dollar, the loan was worth more
than seventeen million dollars.
14 The performance of the BCI Polish loan, despite the success of the placement of the !rst tranche
(with a demand ten times greater than the supply), faded when the weakening of the zloty
and the failure of Grabski’s political attempt urged the Polish government to use the Italian
currency to defend the Polish currency. At the end of 1931, the BCI portfolio was still engulfed
with seventy million lire of the 1924 Polish loan (Asso 1993: 331–335).
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ambassador in Rome wrote to his secretary of state that Toeplitz had
obtained Mussolini’s guarantee on the Polish loan in return for BCI
support in the impending elections of April 1924 (De Cecco 1993:755–
756). The reality is simpler than that. We have seen how bankers
of Toeplitz’s generation saw currency stabilization as a process to be
worked out by private capital markets rather than by (and through)
the LoN. Moreover, since the Polish loan was functional to Mussolini’s
political interests, Toeplitz’s pragmatic strategy was to take advantage of
his in"uence in his motherland to negotiate a loan meant to strengthen
his frail relations with the Duce and lessen the authority of the Italian
central bank.
Apart from personal divergences, which are not surprising if one con-
siders themilieu from which they came, there were objective reasons for
the Stringher-Toeplitz con"ict. Stringher had been general director of
the Treasury before running the BoI. A convinced nationalist, at the
beginning of the 1920s Stringher understood his role as central banker
in a different way to that set out at the 1922Genoa international mone-
tary conference (James 2001:33–34). By mid 1920s, however, the wave
of stabilization programs related to international cooperation schemes
to which the BoI had been called to take part, and the moral suasion
of Montagu Norman (governor of the Bank of England) and Benjamin
Strong (governor of the New York Fed), had the effect of slowly con-
verting Stringher to the doctrine of central banking.15
The BCI Polish loan was at odds with the enforcement of central
banks international cooperation supported by Norman. It was consid-
ered a premature move also by private bankers such as Russel Lef!ng-
well of the House of Morgan which, in 1923, had rebuffed an attempt
by the Polish government to negotiate a small loan. While the English
central banker refused the logic of Toeplitz’s arti!cial stabilization of the
zloty, the American private banker was concerned by the depressing
outlook of the Polish economy, worsened by the geopolitical fragility
of the country and the unsolved problem of its war debts towards the
United States. In the wake of the BCI, in February 1925 the American
bank Dillon, Read and Co. negotiated another unsuccessful loan with
15 That the process was far from being concluded is con!rmed by an editorial of The Banker.
In assessing the functioning, power and independence of different central banks around the
world, the prestigious review considered the central banks of France and Belgium as “more or
less willing instrument of weak !nancial Governments.” The BoI was considered in the same
terms, even though, the editorial added, “to a lesser extent” (“A Survey of World Banking,”
The Banker, June 1926: 443–448).
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Poland that “far from furnishing Poland with her coveted breakthrough
loan, . . . stigmatized the Polish state in the eyes of !nancial commu-
nity” (Pease 1986:39). It was only after the coup d’e´tat staged by Jo´zef
Piłsudski inMay 1926, that an improved economic situation stimulated
a growing in"ow of foreign capital (Landau and Tomaszewski 1990:
275). In this climate, the American bank Blair and Co., through the
intermediation of its French subsidiary led by Jean Monnet, negotiated
with the Polish government a stabilization loan that presented more
than a similarity with the BCI loan. In a context of declining mutual
trust between central banks, the Polish loan became another source
of tension between the Bank of England, the Banque de France and the
Federal reserve of New York (Meyer 1970).
From an internal perspective, the 1924 Polish loan exposed dra-
matically the BoI and BCI’s contrasting opinions about the hierarchy
within the Italian banking system. In Stringher’s view, the BoI, as sys-
temic “bank of the banks,” was called on to manage the reserves which,
together with savings, represented the measure of liquidity. Toeplitz
considered the BoI a mere “bank among banks.” In his scheme, the uni-
versal banks “created” money and the central bank had to provide lend-
ing of last resort in cases of liquidity shortage (Piluso 2011). This actu-
ally happened in June 1925, when the BCI underwent serious liquidity
dif!culties due to a massive withdrawal of foreign deposits, and the BoI
was forced to inject liquidity to the tune of 30 percent of the bank’s
total fund raising (Toniolo 2003: 325). In July 1925 Volpi replaced De
Stefani as Minister of Finance. The move was likely due to the mount-
ing hostility of the business community against De Stefani – namely
against his controversial decree to curb the exuberance of stock mar-
kets (February 1925) that, coupled with the increase in the discount
rate from 5.5 to 6 percent, triggered a bourse collapse which anticipated
the 1926 de"ationary turnaround (Baia Curioni 1995:330–342).
The entry of Volpi in the control room of the Italian economy rep-
resented good news for Toeplitz and the BCI. The Count of Misurata,
the city in Libya where Volpi had resided as Governor of Tripolitania,
had maintained an excellent relationship with Toeplitz after meeting
him in Naples at the end of the century (see section one). In particu-
lar, the arrival of Volpi provided a competitive edge to Toeplitz against
Stringher when, between August 1925 and May 1926, the control of
the Italian currency passed into the hands of Volpi at the expense of
the BoI. In an endeavor to strengthen the lira, Volpi sought the help
of the BCI, which had already received authorization to intervene in
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matters regarding the currency in June 1925 and could put at the dis-
posal of the minister its inestimable treasure of know-how and infor-
mation. During the 1920s, the BCI was the Italian bank with the most
sophisticated multinational network (D’Alessandro 1998; Di Quirico
1999; Piluso and Toninelli 2002). The London andNew York branches,
opened respectively in 1911 and 1918, represented a key tool for Volpi
to defeat speculation. In a context of mounting instability, the BCI
could play a key role in organizing the defense of the lira through reduc-
ing the asymmetry of information. For this reason, immediately after his
appointment Volpi asked Toeplitz to keep him posted “on a daily basis,”
about any signi!cant movements related to the currency market.16 The
maneuver, based on a document produced by the BCI in May 1925,
envisaged a shift in the defense of the lira from the spot to the forward
markets.17 Yet, the most remarkable feature of the combined action of
Toeplitz and Volpi in defense of the lira was that it entailed a large use
of speculation in order to beat private investors on their own ground.
Volpi’s aim was to get the course of the lira under control before dis-
cussing the inter-ally debt agreements with the United States and the
United Kingdom (Romano 1979:131–141). The containment of in"a-
tion through a capping of salaries, and the possibility of getting credit
from abroad, following agreements reached with the United States
(November 1925) and the United Kingdom (January 1926) on the
repayment of the inter-ally debts, represented the ingredients of the
successful currency management carried out by Toeplitz and Volpi until
spring 1926. Subsequently, the lira, which had remained for a while in
the region of 120 against the British pound, lost 18 percent of its value
between April and August. This deterioration pointed to the necessity
of stabilizing “twin currencies” such as the French and Belgian franc,
strictly linked to the lira and the Italian economy. Moreover, it urged
Mussolini – pressed by the international !nancial community– to give
a new governance to the currency.
The Polish loan and the facts of 1925–1926 had reinvigorated
Stringher’s determination to defend the BoI’s autonomy, not only
against the government, but also against the claims of the commercial
banking system. In this process Stringher became, in the eyes of Strong,
16 ASI-BCI, Segreteria Toeplitz (hereafter ST) 82, fasc. 5, Baracchi’s letter to Toeplitz, 13 July
1925. Toeplitz did inform Volpi on a regular basis about movements on the currency market
(ASI-BCI, ST 82, Toeplitz’ letters to Volpi, 1, 8 and 13 August 1925).
17 The document of 26 May 1925, entitled “Mutamenti nelle tendenze del mercato dei cambi e
causa della mancanza di divise estere in Italia,” is in De Cecco 1993: 940–943.
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“a thoroughgoing central banker,” able to “talk the language in ortho-
dox style.”18 Meeting the Duce inMay 1926, Strong was adamant about
the fact that a stabilization plan could not disregard Stringher and the
BoI, which had to be the pivot of the maneuver (De Cecco 1993:64–
67). Mussolini’s speech in Pesaro, on 18 August 1926, sent a strong sig-
nal to the international markets and launched a dramatic appreciation
of the lira. While Mussolini was launching his “battle for quota 90,” a
series of reforms related to the stabilization of the lira and the adoption
of the gold standard were implemented. In July 1926 a Royal Decree
granted the BoI the monopoly of note issuing. In September 1926 a law
was passed for the protection of savings conferred to the BoI supervisory
powers on the Italian banking system (Conti 2008:435–437). The lira
was eventually stabilized at 92.46 sterling in December 1927. Toeplitz
was obliged to cheer Mussolini when quota 90 was achieved.19 In the
months which preceded the stabilization, however, he did not conceal
his frustration with the monetary policy pursued by the regime. The cri-
tiques were directed not against the stabilization per se, but against the
level of the lira’s appreciation.20 While the strategic defeat of Toeplitz
was taking place, Stringher could proudly write to his “colleagues” Nor-
man and Strong that the BoI had “enter[ed] into absolute possession of
the reserves” and had “assume[d] the responsibility of maintaining the
gold value of the lira.”21
Did the events of the mid 1920s affect Toeplitz’s original beliefs on
currency stabilization? A letter of the Polish-born banker provides an
enlightening answer to this question. The letter, written in February
1931, was addressed to his old friend, the engineer and industrialist
Heineman, who he met in Naples at the end of the nineteenth century
(see section one). During the 1920s this cosmopolitan businessman,
at the helm of the electrical multinational holding Socie´te´ !nancie`re
de transports et d’entreprises industrielles (So!na), had been among the
main supporters of Pan-Europa, the movement founded by Richard de
Coudenhove-Kalergi. In the second part of the decade, he had argued
for an international cartel of electricity producers and distributors. In
18 [Strong to Harrison, May 1926].
19 This achievement, in the affected wording of the banker “represented the basis for a steady and
effective development of the Italian economy and the banking system” (See ASI-BCI, CpT
57, f. 19, telegram to Mussolini, 22 December 1927).
20 A large part of the Italian business community considered quota 120 the threshold below which
the appreciation of the lira could harm the Italian economy (Baf! 1973: 115).
21 [December 1927].
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November 1930, Heineman was invited to Cologne by the then burgo-
master Konrad Adenauer to give a talk on the future of Europe. On that
occasion he presented the idea of a European federation – a plea which
inspired similar events in Barcelona and Paris. Heineman’s speeches
were published in a pamphlet in English, French and German (Ranieri
2005:334–335). In Outline of a New Europe, Heineman built on the
idea elaborated by the German engineer Oskar Oliven for a European
electric network intended to create a bridge between the industrial-
ized western Europe and the agricultural eastern Europe (Schot and
Lagendijk 2008:207–201). To overcome the dualism between what
Heineman de!ned as the “horse-power Europe A” and the “draught-
horse Europe B,” and to overcome the crisis in which it was engulfed,
Europe had to !nd inspiration from the United States, and build its
reconstruction on three pillars: one technical, the already mentioned
electric network; one administrative, the removal of administrative bar-
riers to trade; one !nancial, the free circulation of capitals (Heineman
1931).
Toeplitz received the French version of the pamphlet (Esquisse d’une
Europe nouvelle) and wrote a long letter to his friend which contained
a good deal of skepticism toward Heineman’s ideas. Toeplitz conceded
that in Europe there were twenty-seven countries whose borders repre-
sented an obstacle to business, but he invited his friend to consider that
there were also about thirty different languages and seven religions to
take into account, together with the strength of traditions and af!ni-
ties that, in spite of Heineman’s dreams, “paraıˆt eˆtre plutoˆt en train de
s’accroıˆtre que de diminuer.” According to Toeplitz, Heineman’s new
Europe could work as a federation of engineers, but not as a federation
of bankers. The bankers, as long as depositors give them not a single
currency but “des lires, des livres, des francs ou des "orins, symbols de
particularismes nationaux, ” would always stand “plus ou moins du coˆte´
des politiciens.”22
This prescient letter was written in 1931. While in September, the
gold exchange standard revealed the contradiction at the very core
of the system, when the British Pound was obliged to abandon its
ill-conceived parity, during the same year a systemic banking crisis
involved several European countries: Austria, Germany, Hungary and
Italy. In particular, the Credit-Anstalt’s collapse, which triggered the
trouble in May, marked the nadir of !nancial globalization, as Baring’s
22 Cfr. ASI-BCI, CpT 71, ff. 432–435, letter to Heinemann, 2 February 1931.
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salvage had epitomized its zenith. Established by the Rothschilds during
the middle of the 1850s, the glorious Viennese bank, chaired by Louis
Von Rothschild, since the moment of its foundation “stood in the fore-
front of international !nance” (Schubert 1991:11). With the solidarity
within the international banking community weakened after WWI, as
exempli!ed by the !gures on the collapse of foreign bankers sitting in
the board of directors of other countries’ banks, the Credit-Anstalt’s
crisis proved that bankers could no longer save banks through informal
late-nightmeetings in the secluded world of London clubs: new forms of
regulation and valuation techniques were badly needed. The bankers,
as Toeplitz bitterly acknowledged, had to sit on the side of politicians –
a rather surprising change of perspective for a banker that, in 1916, had
declared to the British ambassador in Rome that he did not believe in
“political banks,” and that banks “should con!ne [themselves] to busi-
ness affair.”23
LOUIS MARLIO. THE ACCUMULATION OF A HUGE
HUMAN CAPITAL UNTIL THE GREAT WAR
Born on 3 February 1878, Marlio came from a relatively wealthy
Parisian family which, however was not part of the French elite. His
father studied law and was an of!cial auctioneer (commissaire priseur)
of the art and antiquities district of Paris, around rue Drouot, where
the family lived until the death of Marlio’s mother, in 1890. Marlio’s
social promotion passed through a successful education and then – as
in the case of Toeplitz – by the Bourdieuan “multiplier effect” of his con-
spicuous social capital. When he was twenty years old, Marlio won the
public competition to enter the Ecole Polytechnique, the leading French
engineering school that formed a large part of the French administra-
tion and business elites. Marlio’s classmates were, inter alia, the future
car industrialist Andre´ Citroen and the pioneer of well logging indus-
try Conrad Schlumberger (Pose 1955). According to the informal rules
that governed the carriers of the graduates from the Ecole Polytechnique,
the !rst ten of them usually continued their education at the Ecole des
Mines de Paris, in order to enter in the Grand Corp of state engineers
of mines, also known as X-Mines. The former Polytechnique students
23 National Archives, Foreign Of!ce, 368/1540, memorandum of James Rennell Rodd to the
Foreign Minister Edward Gray, 1 June 1916.
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ranking from the eleventh to the twentieth position were instead des-
tined to the Ecole des Ponts et Chausse´es, to then become members of
the Grand Corps of state engineers of bridges, also known as X-Ponts
(Joly 2013). Marlio ranked sixteenth and, following the classic excur-
sus honorum of his education, became an X-Pont and passed through
the different echelons of this administrative body from 1904 to 1910.24
At Ponts et Chausse´es, Marlio became a disciple of the famous liberal
economist Clement Colson, he too a former X-Ponts, who merged the
classical liberalism of Jean-Baptiste Say with the marginalist approach
of Le´onWalras. Colson was a !ne expert of the pricing of services under
monopolies, such as railways and transports (Picory 1989; Le Van-Le
Mesle 2005). This encounter not only crafted the political views of
Marlio in the !eld of liberal economy; it also shaped the early career
and the !rst orientation of the future Grand Patron. Actually, Marlio
focused his main scienti!c interests into railways and waterways – the
main interest of Colson as a scholar and state engineer. After his grad-
uation at Ponts et Chausse´es, Marlio undertook, like Colson, a further
specialization in law (Pose 1955; Morsel 1987). He obtained a PhD in
1907 with a thesis dedicated to German policy of national water trans-
portations, which was published a year later (Marlio 1908), and which
he completed following a series of !eld trips he made to Germany as
a state engineer.25 After his PhD, he achieved an impressive career in
the administration. In 1909 he served as Chef du Cabinet Technique of
the Minister of Public Works Alexandre Millerand – a future President
of the Republic during the 1920s. In 1910, when he was only thirty-
two, he won the competition to become Maitre de Requeˆtes (counsel)
at the Council of State, one of the highest positions that a young of!-
cer could achieve within the French administration (Pose 1955; Morsel
1987; Hachez-Leroy 2010).
In parallel to his impressive career in the public administration,
Marlio started also a brilliant career as professor in the Parisian aca-
demic !eld thanks to Colson’s guidance and reputation. In 1908 he
became professor of transports at theHaute Ecole du Commerce (HEC),
in which Colson had taught until 1905. In 1910 he also obtained the
24 Archives de l’Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chausse´es, Personal Documents of Louis Mar-
lio. Archives nationales, fonds des membres de la le´gion d’honneur (base Le´onore), !le
1980/0035/11386.
25 Archives nationales, fonds des membres de la le´gion d’honneur (base Le´onore), !le
1980/0035/11386.
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chair of political economy (e´conomie politique) at Sciences Po, in which
Colson had become professor in 1905. In 1919, thanks to Colson, he
was designed to substitute Charles Gide, one of the fathers of the cor-
poratism in France who was opposed to liberalism (Pe´nin 1997), for the
chair of social economics at the Ecole des Ponts et Chausse´e. He also con-
tinued teaching at the HEC and at Sciences Po (international business)
until the eve of the 1930s. In 1934,Marlio obtained also the chair in the
section of economics at the Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques,
where both Colson and Millerand were already members.26
If the liberal economist Colson crafted Marlio’s orientation at the
University and his career in the administration and academia, the
encounter with the socialist Millerand was decisive for his shift to
the private business, where his experience of public servant emerged
as a crucial factor. Between August 1914 and October 1915, Millerand
served as Minister of War and Marlio, in his quality of top-level civil
servant already implicated with Millerand when the latter was Minis-
ter of the Public Works, was mobilized at the center of the French war
effort: the Grand Quartier Ge´ne´ral. Once there, he occupied relevant
positions in the administration of the transports and of the war supplies,
getting in touch with the big French private business. As reported by
Marlio himself (1927, 1938), the progressive impoverishment of public
of!cers during the in"ation years was the main cause of his shift to the
more remunerative private business. Yet, the knowledge of the public
machine matured during the war, his proximity with the Ministry of
War, and his former experience as state engineer and top-level counsel,
became a crucial competitive advantage for the !rms that hired Mar-
lio. Actually, in 1916, Marlio entered the board of governors of Pro-
duits Chimiques d’Alais et de la Camargue (PCAC), one of the leading
French aluminum and chemical company. One year later, he was called
to replace PCAC’s general director, Adrien Badin, who died abruptly.
At the same time, Marlio became the executive director of Aluminium
Franc¸ais, the French national cartel of the aluminum producers that
served as the principal market organizer of the French aluminum mar-
ket during WWI and afterward (Hachez-Leroy 1999).
The arrival of a high-level public servant at the head of both themain
French aluminum producer and the commercial entity of this metal,
epitomized the stronger bonds established, because of the war, between
26 Archives de l’Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chausse´es, Personal Documents of Louis Marlio.
ENPC, Enseignements, modules, professeurs, 1747–1992,!Economie"
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private business and public administration (Cailluet 1997). Moreover,
in the speci!c !eld of aluminum, Marlio participated into the organi-
zation and the coordination of the whole Allied war efforts, dealing
directly with his American and British homologues. The French pro-
duction of aluminum was not fully deployed during the war because a
great part of the hydroelectricity needed for this production was utilized
for realizing explosives. That pushed France to become a big importer
of this metal from the United States and exposed the French war mar-
ket to the high price of aluminum due to the in"ation and the general
shortage of this commodity. In the !rst part of the war, the competi-
tion between France, Britain, Italy and Russia to obtain the Ameri-
can metal provoked further distress to the war effort. Soon after the
entry of the United States into the con"ict, and the creation of the
Interallied Munition Board, this industry was reorganized, according
to a direct observer of the aluminum business, as a kind of “cartel de
guerre” through which the administrators of the aluminum !rms in the
belligerent countries stabilized prices and allocated resources (Pitaval
1938).
The role of Marlio during WWI led him to continue his frequen-
tation with the Ministers of War who succeeded Millerand – Albert
Thomas and, especially, Louis Loucheur – and to become acquainted
with other highly in"uential politicians such as Etienne Clementel.
Loucheur played a crucial role in the settlement of the French war
effort. Inspired by the GermanWalter Rathenau, Loucheur reorganized
the French production for the war effort as a system of cartels and inter-
!rm networks – an experience which continued after the war to help
the transition to peace economy (Loucheur took the position of Min-
ister for the Industrial Reconstruction). As Dominique Barjot points
out, the war experience of Loucheur was decisive to craft his 1925 pro-
posal, to use international cartels to promote the return to economic
normalcy after the shock of the war and the uni!cation of the Euro-
pean market (Barjot 20123). Clementel was founder and president of
the ICC and contributed, as Minister of Finance, to the achievement
of the Dawes Plan for Germany’s reparations and to the normalization
of the relationships between France and Germany during the 1920s.
For Clementel as well, the return to normalcy after the shock of the
war passed thought the recasting of the commerce, of the free trade and
the return to the free-enterprise; these ideas explain why he took an
active role in the creation of ICC in 1919 (Kuisel 1981; Godfrey 1987;
Rousseau 1998).
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EXPERT OR OPINION MAKER? MARLIO AND THE
INTERNATIONAL DEBATE ON CARTELS
The career of Marlio in the private business rose after the war, when
he took on prestigious roles in the French national industry. In 1921,
when PCAC merged with the other leading French aluminum !rm,
Socie´te´ Electrome´tallurgique Franc¸aise (SEMF), Marlio became the chief
executive of!cer of the new !rm,Alais, Froges et Camargue (AFC, which
after the SecondWorldWar was renamed Pechiney). In 1939 he became
also the president of AFC. In 1924, Marlio entered in the board of gov-
ernors of the Socie´te´ des Chemins de Fer de l’Est, one of the six leading
railways companies in France, and in 1934 he became its president.
In 1938, when SNCF was created, Marlio became vice-president of
the new company that represented a joint venture between the state
and the already mentioned six leading French railways. Apart from
SNCF’s !rst executive director, Robert Le Besnerais, Marlio was the
only top manager of the railways company who came from the pri-
vate sector (SNCF’s president, Pierre Guinand, and a second deputy
president, were both nominated as representatives of the French gov-
ernment) (Caron 2005). Marlio became the president of some elec-
trical companies as well, and he entered the board of directors of the
Union pour l’Industrie et l’Electricite´, whose chairman was Ernst Mercier.
Marlio played also a big role within the French business organizations
and in the more or less informal business meetings organized during
the interwar period. In 1921, he was appointed president of the Cham-
bre Syndicale des Forces Hydroliques and was named vice-president of
theUnion des Industries Minie`res et Me´tallurgiques, while he participated
at the meetings of the movement “Redressement franc¸ais,” of X-Crises
and he collaborated with the Comite´ Franco-Allemand (Morsel 1987;
Fraboulet, 2007).
Endowed with a background of economic liberal ideas, Marlio passed
directly through a process of apprenticeship in a high-cartelized indus-
try in which private business and public powers interacted intensively
to put in place a sort of industrial diplomacy for the allocation of
resources. He became aware of the new phenomenon of interplay
between state and industry through his participation into the organized
interests of the French electrical and metallurgical !rms. His beliefs
about the desirability of a free and competitive economy were rein-
forced by his experience. In his visions, the price settled by a cartel
was closer to the market price than the prices !xed by governmental
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authorities. In this respect, the in"uence of Loucheur was decisive to
consider cartels as a means of ef!ciency that could reduce the distor-
tions of state intervention. In his activity as a businessman, he pro-
moted this kind of approach to aluminum industry at the international
level. Marlio worked, since November 1918, with other Allied alu-
minum producers in order to set cartel agreements to help the return
to normalcy and to use them to recast an open market for this metal.
These efforts, however, were frustrated by the dismal state of the mon-
etary system and the persistence of the state controls over the produc-
tion and trade of aluminum. According to Marlio, state intervention in
monetary and industrial matters had the effect of completely altering,
the international competition between !rms (Bertilorenzi 2015).
Marlio tried to recast a more liberal attitude toward the aluminum
trade after WWI acting at the political level. In his role as President
of the Chambre Syndicale des Forces Hydroliques, Marlio obtained from
the French government the suppression of political controls over the
aluminum trade between 1921 and 1922, in order to help British and
Swiss producers to gain back control over their properties of the baux-
ite resources in the southern part of France. Once back to a more “nor-
mal” business economy in aluminum, Marlio led the process to create
an international cartel, with the idea to reduce the international price
of this metal and harmonize the global output with its demand. Since
1922,Marlio also worked to involve theGerman producers into the reg-
ular meetings held between ex-Allied !rms. This was a !rst real attempt
of appeasement between Germany and France, which anticipated the
Dawes Plan and the Loucheur proposal to use cartel for the creation
of a true European market. Like Loucheur, Marlio thought that pri-
vate agreements could help the market economy to reemerge from the
political control: this vision inspired his leadership of the international
aluminum oligopoly. Even if they were an emendation to the market
economy, the cartel prices for aluminum were considered as ef!cient
because they were linked to the producing costs, which were falling due
to technological progress and the rapid increase of the scale economies.
In 1926, when !nally the European cartel (Aluminium-Association)
was formed,Marlio was called to preside it. He kept the role of president
also in 1931, when a new global cartel, Alliance Aluminium Compag-
nie, was founded (Bertilorenzi 2015).
At the end of the 1920s, the debate over cartels allowed Marlio to
play new important roles in international politics. The Loucheur pro-
posal to use cartels as means of economic recovery and reuni!cation was
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highly endorsed by Clementel at the ICC, and became one of the lead-
ing themes at the 1927 LoN Economic Conference.27 After the Confer-
ence, the debate about cartels was linked to the proposal to reduce tariff
barriers and promote effective market integration in Europe (Bussie`re
1994). The LoN and the ICC continued to put at the center of their
analyses the theme of cartels even after the Economic Conference,
when they settled a special committee to promote the adoption of car-
tels as a means to both self-regulate the industry and help the transi-
tion to a more free-trade economy. Cartels were considered as a way to
revive liberal principles within the international economy after WWI
shock. Since cartels were “voluntary” institutions, merely responding
to economic needs, any mandatory involvement by political powers in
national or international cartels was considered as highly perverse.
A joint ICC-LoN agency, theComite´ des Ententes Industrielles (CEII),
was created in 1928 in order to undertake the “promotion” of cartels and
their use for the purpose of trade barrier reductions. The CEII gathered
prestigious industrialists from cartelized industries. Marlio was among
them because of his role as president of the Aluminium-Association,
because of his double reputation as businessman and member of the
academia and because of his intimacy with the leaders of the ICC.28
Other top cartelists of the interwar period were involved in this ini-
tiative. Aloys Meyer was invited because of his chairmanship of the
Entente Internationale de l’Acier, while Harry McGowan, chairman of
Imperial Chemical Industries and member of the boards of many car-
tels in the chemical industry, replaced Alfred Mond, who was initially
designed for the CEII, after his death. Gino Olivetti, a prominent Ital-
ian industrialist and president of the ICC, also served as an expert in
this committee, as did Clemens Lammers and Antonio Stefano Benni.
If the former was a leading member of the German Reichsverband der
deutschen Industrie, the latter was the president of the Confederazione
Generale Fascista dell’Industria Italiana,29 and both were already engaged
in several committees at the LoN economic conference (Curli 1990;
D’Alessandro 2007). During 1930 and 1931, the CEII organized four
conferences to study the problem of cartels. They resulted in the publi-
cation of two reports, edited by the LoN. The !rst, titled Etude (Benni
27 Archives ICC, Proce`s-Verbal du 21 Conseil, 25 June 1926.
28 Archives LoN, R.2857, !le 16770, Consultation d’Experts en matie`re d’ententes industrielles.
Service d’un expert Franc¸ais, 29 December 1929.
29 Archives LoN, R.2829, !le 13731, Ententes Industrielles, Collaboration de MM Lammers et
Benni, 1929.
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et al. 1931a), included speci!c case studies; the second explored the
general nature of cartels and was titled Rapport Ge´ne´ral (Benni et al.
1931b).30 The group of experts claimed to present the theme of cartels
from an objective point of view. It was argued that the experts’ reputa-
tion, along with their inner knowledge of cartels, represented the best
guarantee for the quality of the information provided.31
For the writing of the Etude and the Rapport Ge´ne´ral, the CEII made
use of Marlio’s 1930 article (Marlio 1930), in which the author argued
in favor of cartels for the rationalization of the European economy.
According to the CEII, the above mentioned studies provided evidence
that cartels could serve to reduce costs and to stabilize prices. These
publications de!ned cartels as “des associations entre des entreprises
inde´pendantes de la meˆme branche ou de branches analogues, cre´es
en vue d’une ame´lioration des conditions de la production ou de la
vente” (Benni et al. 1931b:8).32 Cartels were also presented as bene-
!cial to public welfare because they sought to “e´viter les conse´quences
de´sastreuses de la concurrence de´re´gle´e entre de tre`s grandes usines qui,
dans les pe´riodes de de´pression e´conomique ou en cas de surproduction,
ne peuvent plus marcher qu’a` allure re´duite” (Benni et al. 1931b:36–
37). Cartels, for instance, could !ght in"ation through the process of
stabilization of commodity prices, and restrain the adoption of trade
barriers and bilateral agreements, limiting the role of the state into
trade andmonetary controls.33 Furthermore, it was argued, cartels could
serve a political purpose, namely the resumption of liberal economy. Fit-
ting perfectly with Polanyi’s narrative, the debate about cartels demon-
strated that its leading protagonists were considering market manipu-
lations as a necessary tool to bring back free market economy.
In spite of these ideas, the international economic panorama
changed abruptly on the eve of the 1930s, as a consequence of the
Great Depression. Cartels did not prove very useful in this circum-
stance, while governmental policies produced more effective result.
Marlio observed directly this transition in the sector of the aluminum
industry. Since 1931, the abandonment of the parity by the British
30 Archives Lon, R.2830, !le 20773, Ententes Industrielles. Pubblications de Monographies,
1930.
31 Archives ICC, Proce`s-Verbal du 32 Conse´il, 4 March 1930.
32 “Cartels are associations in which independent !rms, either of the same industrial branch or
of similar branches aim to ameliorate production or sales conditions.”
33 “Avoid the ruinous consequences of cutthroat competition amongst large producing units that,
during periods of economic depression or during periodical over-production crises, can no
longer work at economics of scale.”
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Pound put in jeopardy the international pricing model for aluminum,
which until then was expressed in £/ton. A complicated system of con-
version between £-paper and £-gold was settled, while the Swiss Franc
was adopted for the internal transactions (metal swaps and stocks con-
trols) of the cartel. Nevertheless, the new monetary instability drove
the former international trade in aluminum industry to an end and
brought about the reemergence of governments as actors of the eco-
nomic regulation. After Hitler’s takeover and, above all, after the new
monetary and trade policies set by Hjalmar Schacht, the German Min-
ister of Economics and Reichbank’s president, the German delegates
claimed the need to change the working of the aluminum cartel. They
proposed a system of national monopolies, in order to free German alu-
minum industry from any limitation related to the quotas.34 Louis Mar-
lio, as president of the Alliance, was directly involved in the search for
a compromise between the different components of the cartel. During
1935, Marlio negotiated with Schacht in person, granting the German
group some exceptions to the output limitation with respect to the car-
tel rules. These exceptions, however, put in jeopardy the cohesion of
the cartel. The British delegates asked for the same exceptions and, in
1936, a general negotiation started in order to settle a new system based
on the “home markets.” The rush to rearmament !nally hampered the
continuation of the negotiations and the cartel was put on hold in 1938
(Bertilorenzi 2014).
Aside aluminum, in other three cases the transition toward a new
and growing role of politics into the international cartelization move-
ment took place. The steel cartel, which worked between 1926 and
1931 by means of production quotas, was not able to cope with the
Great Depression and with the development of national policies to
support steel production. The tension between the international self-
regulation and the national policies drove the cartel to an end in 1931.
After about a couple of years of negotiations, a new cartel was created
with a system of reservations for “home markets” of its members. Each
group was completely free to produce for the domestic market without
quotas, while the cartel only !xed export quotas (Hexner 1946:82–83;
34 C’e´tait une erreur de penser de re´gler le marche´ de l’aluminium par l’entremise de l’Alliance.
Le cartel international de l’acier a commis la mȇme faute [ . . . ]. C’est pourquoi je suis decide´
d’organiser tout d’abord l’exportation dans mon pays, a!n de pouvoir vous demander ensuite de
nous arranger sur les marches d’exportation – Rio Tinto Archives Paris, Pechiney Documents,
00–2–15929, Alliance, Comite´ de Direction, “PV 15e`me Re´union du Board of governors,”
10 February 1934.
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Barbezat 1989; Berger 2000). In the case of tin and rubber, new types
of agreements emerged to reduce outputs and stockpile excess. These
agreements, reached under the control of political authorities, were
very innovative because governments played a relevant role in theman-
agement of the stocks and the buffering of the market. This kept some
of the unsold stocks outside the market, allowing for minimizing the
output and manipulating the prices (Coates 1987; Hillman 2010). The
main problem for programs of output restriction was that the general
economic crisis of the 1930s made the acceptance of sacri!ces even
dif!cult. The earlier de!nition of cartels as voluntary and private orga-
nizations, did not suit anymore this new scenario.
Louis Marlio tried to use the CEII to promote a vision according to
which only private cartels could have solved the economic turmoil of
the Great Depression and to criticize state intervention in the man-
agement of cartels as a source of further disequilibrium. Even within
the CEII, however, a new vision about the political intervention into
cartelization slowly emerged. Lammers, for instance, became a sup-
porter of the role of governments which, according to him, had the
merit of making cartels more cohesive and effective. Benni pointed
out that the crisis was changing the range of cartels. In his opinion,
while during the 1920s cartels served to provide governance to the
international markets, the crisis of the 1930s called for the adoption
of new regulations at a national level that compelled governments to
intervene in the promotion of cartels, like in the Italian and German
cases.35 This internal debate about the nature of cartels did not know a
de!nitive solution during the 1930s. The 1937 congress of the ICC,
which was largely devoted to Lammers’ group on international car-
tels, discussed three possible models of cartels. The aluminum industry,
described by Louis Marlio, was presented as the Idealtypus of the private
cartel, in spite of its on-going transformation toward new forms of gov-
ernance. The tin and rubber industries, by contrast, were described by
Sir John Campbell, who according to Hillman (2010) was their leading
crafter, as examples of agreements under strict governmental control.
Between these two categories, Meyer described the steel industry as a
combination in which public powers endorsed and helped the estab-
lishment of the cartel (International Chamber of Commerce 1937).
35 Proce`s-Verbal de la Commission des Ententes Industrielles Internationales, 27 and 28 June
1934, Archives LoN, serie 11803, !le 13855.
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Marlio’s failure in imposing his views to the CEII pushed him to shift
from the level of expert maneuvering behind the scenes, to the role
of the expert who openly defends his opinions about the desirability
of the liberal economy. Already in 1934, when these transformations
were only at the beginning stage, he took part in the debate about the
“e´conomie dirige´e” of Andre´ Siegfried, condemning the irrationality
that led governments to elaborate economic and military plans (Mar-
lio 1934). Perhaps,Marlio decided to become amember of theAcademie
des Sciences Morales and Politiques in 1934 to carry out more ef!ciently
his battle for liberalism against state interventionism. The authority
provided by the acquiredmembership of this cultural institution pushed
him to undertake an intense activity as essayist, with the publication of
a half of dozen books which he signed as proud “membre de l’Institut.”
In 1935 Marlio published an essai about the Treaty of Versailles
(Marlio 1935), in which for the !rst time he talked openly about the
failure of the supra-nationalism of the LoN. In spite of the fact that he
had believed in the LoN-ICCmethods – to which he also contributed –
he considered the nationalism contained in the fourteen points of
Wilson, in particular the one on the self-determination of nations,
detrimental to the free market economy, to internationalism and, as a
consequence, to peace. This ideas were also developed in his last book,
Le Cercle Infernal, where he wrote : “C’est un paradoxe de baser la paix
des nations sur l’association des nations qui sont, par essence, les plus
belliquesuses de toutes collectivite´s” (Marlio 1951:278).
In 1938, Marlio published his !rst book as businessman “engage´”
titled Le sort du capitalisme (Marlio 1938). His thought about the
liberalism evolved toward a more social vision of the economy. While
the old liberalism of Adam Smith was not applicable to the new big
business economy, Marlio did not consider “dirigisme” and state inter-
ventionism as the solution to the economic crisis. His vision shifted
toward some form of “capitalisme organise´” in which, while cartels were
fundamental to self-regulate the international economy, organizations
of employers and workers should have self-managed the resolution of
their con"icts in the national !elds, without state intervention. Le sort
du capitalisme granted to Marlio the invitation to the Colloque Lipp-
mann which, held in Paris in 1938, was often considered the birth of
the neo-liberal movement and which was motivated by the journey
to France of Walter Lippman, the author of The Good Society - a !rst
criticism to the New Deal. The Colloque gathered the main personali-
ties of the future intellectual movement that led to the creation of the
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Mont Pelerin Society: Aron, Marjolin, Von Hayek, Von Mises, Ropke,
Van Zeeland andmany others (Denord 2007; Audier 2012, 2014) Some
scholarly studies assume that Marlio himself, on that occasion, coined
the term “neo-liberalism.” His “ne´o-liberalism” was synonym of a more
social vision of the liberal economy, in which organizations were con-
sidered as elements of self-regulation. While he agreed with the other
participants about the aberration of state intervention into economy,
Marlio also defended cartels as means of self-regulation. After the con-
ference, Marlio became the !rst president of the ephemeralCentre inter-
national pour la renovation du libe´ralisme (CIERL), an initiative which
ran only for one year and which aimed to promote the recasting of
liberism. In Dictature ou Liberte´ (Marlio, 1940), Marlio saw state inter-
vention into economy as a form of dictatorship, strictly linking general
freedom to the freedom of economic and social actors to settle private
agreements.
These beliefs were reinforced during World War II (WWII), when
Marlio left France and moved to the United States (in June 1940).
According to Henri Morsel (1987), Marlio obtained permission to be
sent to the United States with an of!cial mission to promote the image
of France there and to help the trade of foodstuff between France and
the United States. In fact, the secret purpose of Marlio’s mission was
to push the Americans to enter the con"ict.36 When he arrived in
the United States, Marlio got to know the Brookings Institution, a
powerful American counseling agency close to the Democratic Party
that supported the American intervention in the war. As requested by
its president, Harold Moulton, Marlio was hired by Brookings as an
expert in economics and international affairs. The think tank !nanced
the publication of several studies on the possibility that the United
States could enter the war, the military superiority of Americans com-
pared to dictatorships and which strategy to adopt toward Japan and
Germany.37 Thanks to the intermediation of the Brookings, Marlio
took an active role in the rapid rearmament of the American industry.
The US government commissioned two studies to Marlio: one on the
production of aluminum in theUnited States and the other on the elec-
trical energy for the American military production. Marlio served as
36 TNA, FO 371/24354, Sir Samuel Hoare, (British ambassador in Madrid), Reported mission of
M. Marlio to United States of America, 30 June 1940.
37 Brookings InstitutionArchive,WashingtonD.C. (ABI), Personal documents ofMr. LouisMar-
lio, Harold G. Moulton to Louis Marlio, 25 August 1941. Harold G. Moulton to Louis Marlio,
22 August 1944.
275
Trim: 228mm × 152mm Top: 8.084mm Gutter: 18.98mm
CUUK3000-08 CUUK3000/Mallard and Sgard ISBN: 978 1 107 13091 3 October 1, 2015 11:55
MARCO BERTILORENZI AND GIUSEPPE TELESCA
economic advisor for a new entrant in the American aluminum mar-
ket, Reynolds Metals Company.38 In the United States, Marlio’s ideas
further evolved into which he called “liberalism social.” To this theme
Marlio dedicated three books (Marlio 1943, 1944, 1951) and one pub-
lic conference (Marlio 1946), while on his ideas about cartels published
his “version” of the history of the aluminium cartel (Marlio 1947). His
interwar liberalism, which saw cartels as the kernel of the future inter-
national trade, and his aversion to the active role of the state in the
economy, were implemented by new social visions and political propos-
als. He became very critical toward the controls over trade, people and
currencies which characterized the Bretton Woods post-WWII global
scenario. Instead of the state,Marlio proposed the foundation of a world
government inspired by the theories of Wendell Willkie (1943), which
would have terminated the supra-nationalism of the LoN and ONU.
In each state, he proposed the creation of a Fe´de´ration sociale, in which
trade unions and trade associations would be responsible for the eco-
nomic regulation. This model differed from the corporatist one, because
the state had no role to play. Marlio also criticized one of the pillars of
the modern welfare state, arguing that employers should have taken the
burden to subside the jobless through private foundation. Again, as in
his vision about cartel, the Fe´de´ration was a tool meant to save the fun-
damental mechanism of the market economy from the ineffectiveness
of the state (Marlio, 1951).
CONCLUSION
Our article purported to show that we gain a better understanding of
regulatory approaches to markets by analyzing the spread of new types
of valuation devices across the worlds of high bankers and industrial-
ists. If the Great War weakened the ‘international’ of !nanciers and,
more generally, the pre-war economic elites, the bankers and industri-
alists who promoted international cooperation across national borders
to regulate the growth of global markets in the interwar years did not
take stock immediately of the profound transformations that WWI had
brought about. They realized the magnitude of the change through a
long and painful process of apprenticeship, as we have seen in the case
38 National Archives and Records Administration, RG 107, War Department. Of!ce of the
Under Secretary of War, box 4, Louis Marlio (Brookings Institution) to Mr. Robert P. Pat-
terson (Under Secretary of War), 12 January 1942. ABI, Personal Documents of Mr. Louis
Marlio, Marlio to Moulton, 5 February 1942.
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of Toeplitz. Moreover, they saw in very negative terms the move toward
a larger role of the state in the economy, even though the state was
the main source of their personal and professional achievements, as we
have seen in the case of Marlio. To use Pareto’s image of “history as the
graveyard of elites” – an image elaborated having in mind the carnage
of WWI – this paper demonstrated that economic ideas and forms of
ideal market mechanisms survive for some time before everyone real-
izes they have long been dead.AfterWWI, amounting tension emerged
between the bankers’ and elite industrialists’ beliefs on the one hand,
and the necessity to make use of new forms of regulation and valuation
techniques – once veri!ed the ineffectiveness of the old one – on the
other. If the 1920s witnessed an attempt to restore the international
liberal economy after the shock of the Great War, the Great Depres-
sion showed the impossibility of “recasting bourgeois Europe” (Maier
1975). The impact of state regulation in key economic activities such
as monetary policy, industrial production and international trade, put
an end to the liberalism as it was understood before 1914. This “Great
Transformation” was not without oppositions and adaptations, as this
chapter has demonstrated.
To analyze changes in valuation devices that were being considered
legitimate during both times of normal economic exchange and times
of crisis, we distinguished between two levels: their ef!ciency and their
legitimacy. We argued that valuation devices can still be held legit-
imate, especially by aging elites, during times when they no longer
work well to coordinatemarkets.We showed that themounting tension
between ef!ciency and legitimacy may originate from the slow replace-
ment of older elites, whowere used to interact withmarkets in their own
way, based on prior experience of a world whose rules they still hold to
be valid long after market mechanisms have changed (Mallard 2014).
This process, which evokes Polanyi’s paradox mentioned in the intro-
duction, gave legitimacy to speculation, providing arguments to prove
its ef!ciency in the process of currency stabilization, and to cartels, pre-
senting them as necessary instruments of price valuation at times of
multiplying market failures, and as virtuous examples of self-regulation
in opposition to state interventionism. Both devices (speculation and
cartels) were part of a speci!c narrative about the “return” to liberal
economy, an illusion that delayed the understanding of the real reach
of the “Great Transformation,” as we have seen in the speci!c case of
Toeplitz and Marlio. Both devices (speculation and cartels), lost ef!-
ciency in setting prices, paving the way, during the 1930s, to new forms
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of market regulation in which the state emerged as a new, effective and
legitimized actor.
Jo´zef Leopold Toeplitz, the protagonist of the !rst part of this chap-
ter, epitomizes the international high !nancier of his time. Louis Mar-
lio, analyzed in the second part of this work, is more than a simple
representative of the interwar industrial world. His activities included
also academia, public administration and top-level consultancy for gov-
ernments, such as the French and the American ones, and interna-
tional organizations, such as the ICC and the LoN. This latter uti-
lized Toeplitz’s expertise as well, though not systematically as in the
case of Marlio. As emerges clearly from his comments on Cassel’s non-
orthodox approach to the post-war problems of currency stabilization,
Toeplitz was a practitioner who had learned his profession on-job-
training and was not particularly concerned to elaborate a vision for
the future. Marlio’s vision, as businessman, consultant within the ICC
and the LoN, chairman of the interwar cartels of the international alu-
minum industry and proli!c publicist, was projected to the future. In
Marlio’s view, cartels were an answer to the current crisis but also a
!rst step toward the resumption of liberal economy. Yet, in spite of the
differences, Toeplitz and Marlio – the latter twelve years younger than
the former – had to deal with the same post-war scenario and respond
to the same tough challenges: namely, the creation of some form of
“organising power” in a period of declining pro!ts and the emergence of
new forms of governance for the national and international economies.
These challenges were complicated by the intrinsic liberalism of the
two protagonists of this story.
If we look at the Polish-born banker and the French industrialist from
the standpoint of valuation, we !nd in both the same tension between
beliefs and actions. In the case of Toeplitz, this tension clearly emerges
if we look at his “struggle” against Stringer – a civil servant who, during
the 1920s, can be considered as a central banker “in progress.” During
the mid 1920s, the banker did not hesitate to build a temporary alliance
with the politics – namely his old friend Volpi, the then Minister of
Finance – in order to take over the Italian central bank role in stabi-
lization policies. Toeplitz, a private actor of the banking world, carried
a speci!c vision of market regulation according to which speculation
could help stabilization, incidentally offering to “his” bank the pos-
sibility to realize pro!ts (or vice versa). In the case of Marlio, there
is a continued tension between the strong connections of this busi-
nessman with the liberal !eld in economics, on the one hand, and
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his belief in cartelization as the best tool of market “self-regulation”,
on the other. His opposition to state intervention in economy, which
made him diverge to other French Grand Patrons of his time, lured by
the so-called “dirigisme” (Morsel 1987), is even more surprising if one
considers that Marlio spent a big part of his career in the public admin-
istration. At !rst sight, Marlio’s contradictions are striking: a cartelist
who defends the market economy; a civil servant who does not trust the
public administration; a consultant of the LoN and ICC who did not
like supra-national organizations, a determinant player in the US war
efforts who did not approve the Bretton Woods architecture. In reality,
all these tensions reveal the complexity of the adaptation of economic
actors to the institutional economic change (North 1990).
WWI served as main crafter of the careers of Toeplitz and Marlio.
Toeplitz became, de facto, the number one of the BCI in 1915 after
a long process of apprenticeship. Toeplitz, a former Russian citizen
who had obtained the Italian citizenship in 1912, succeeded to the
“German” (even though “Italianized”) Weil and Joel in a situation
of rising nationalism, which to some extent announced the post-war
advent of fascism. Marlio arrived at the chairmanship of the PCAC
in a dif!cult moment for the !rm, when new commitments with the
French governments linked to the war effort were crafting the rela-
tionship between business and politics within the aluminum indus-
try. When the Inge´nieur Civil des Mines Adrien Badin died in 1917,
the state engineer member of the Grand Corps des Ponts Louis Marlio
was considered the best choice to embody the new proximity of busi-
ness to politics. In the merger of 1921 with the second largest French
aluminum company, Marlio again was called to play the role of busi-
ness continuator. In spite of what Toeplitz and Marlio embodied dur-
ing WWI, a period of extremely complex transition, they spent the
rest of their lives as advocates of the old world that they had con-
tributed to replace. They climbed to top-level roles when national-
ism was at its peak. Aware of this tendency – as clearly emerges from
Toeplitz’s comments to Heimeman’s Esquisse d’une Europe nouvelle and
from the critiques of Marlio to the potential aberrations related to the
Wilsonian principle of self-determination of nations – they proudly
maintained an international pro!le on the eve of globalization sun-
set. Both well equipped and positioned during the 1920s, they did not
fully understand the 1930s. Toeplitz, displaced by the move of the fas-
cist government toward autarky as a response to the Great Depres-
sion, had been already weakened in the second part of the 1920s by
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the “paradigm shift” in banking partially described in section two.
His defence of a (loose) regulatory framework, a business model (the
universal bank) and an interpretation of banking activity that were
destined to be reversed, contributes to turning him into the “old”
banker par excellence, confronted with major institutional, operational
and cultural transformations. Marlio, displaced by the wave of nation-
alizations, “dirigisme” and “plannisme” experienced at a global scale
during the 1930s and after WWII, continued to argue against any
form of state intervention in economy, in opposition to other French
Grand Patrons of his time, lured by these formulas (Morsel 1987) and
in opposition to the post-1945 Bretton Woods order. All this consid-
ered, it is not surprising that both Toeplitz and Marlio, as collateral
damages of the “Great Transformation,” died emarginated and almost
forgotten.
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